California SB277 lawsuit appeal – bad arguments against vaccines

California SB277 lawsuit appeal

On September 30, 2017, the team behind the Buck lawsuit posted their appellate brief regarding the California SB277 lawsuit appeal on Facebook. The initial lawsuit was very badly reasoned, and the brief is no better.

It does not meet its primary goal of convincing the appellate judges that the trial court judge was wrong to dismiss the case, since it does not counter the arguments at the basis of the dismissal, and especially does not give a reason to overturn a hundred years of jurisprudence upholding school immunization requirements. It makes many inaccurate legal and factual claims; it also uses extreme language and bad formatting.

This post will not cover all the problems in the 47 page document. I will try, however, to highlight the main issues.

The case

To remind readers, Buck v. California is one of the first lawsuits filed to block implementation of SB277, which eliminates vaccination personal belief exemptions for students. The lawsuit was brought by eight plaintiffs represented by attorney T. Matthew Philips. The group is openly and extremely anti-vaccine.

Their earlier lawsuit involved bad arguments, was badly written, and ended when a superior court judge sustained the state’s demurrer – in lay terms, the judge dismissed the  plaintiffs’ complaint because it was legally and factually inadequate. Moreover, the trial judge dismissed without leave to amend because the inadequacies in the complaint could not be fixed. The main arguments in the state’s demurrer were that plaintiffs ignored the extensive jurisprudence supporting immunization requirements, which goes back 100 years, they did not properly make a religious freedom claim, their claims that SB277 violates the right to education or equal protection were legally unfounded, and their claim that the medical exemption is too vague was  mistaken.

The plaintiffs appealed to the California Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, and after lengthy procedural delays filed an appellate brief with the court on October 11, 2017 (substantially later than the Facebook post). The brief is problematic both in what it does not do and in what it does do. This post will shortly address why the brief did not, in fact, make a case for overturning the trial’s court decision.

The standard of appellate review in this instance is called de novo.   The appellate court will reexamine the contentions made in the parties’ briefs and decide independently whether the legal standards for sustaining a demurrer (dismissing the lawsuit) were met. The question of whether the lower court should have given the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint is subject to a more deferential standard – that decision will only be overturned if the lower court abused its discretion (id).

Usually, issues not raised at the trial level will not be examined by the court of appeal for the first time, though that court can make an exception if there are good reasons for doing so.  (Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 182 L. Ed. 2d 733 (2012)). The plaintiffs’ appellate brief raises several issues not raised at the trial stage, and the appellate court would be well justified in not addressing those additional issues. However, I will touch on them, since I cannot be sure what the court will do.

California SB277 lawsuit appeal – omissions

The first problem with the appellate brief is that it simply does not respond to the major issues raised in the demurer. The task of the lawyer on appeal is  to convince the appellate court that he did, in fact, state a valid cause of action in the complaint he filed on behalf of his clients. The demurrer, which the trial court sustained, suggested grounds why he did not. The appellate brief, for the most part, did not counter those reasons.

The first basis for sustaining the demurer was that for over 100 years courts – state and federal – have upheld state immunization requirements. But the appellate brief does not directly grapple with that. It does suggest a narrow interpretation of the seminal case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905): it suggests that Jacobson only allowed use of police power to protect health during a public health emergency. While it’s true that the ordinance addressed in Jacobson was passed in the context of an outbreak, and that the case does contain language emphasizing the necessity in this case, and suggesting that there might be circumstances in which the use of police force would be extreme, most of the case uses much broader language, and clearly is not limited only to immediate emergencies.

More important, even if that interpretation of Jacobson was initially plausible, the jurisprudence since created a much broader principle. In Zucht v. King 260 U.S. 174 (1922), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an ordinance imposing a school immunization requirement not during an outbreak – making it clear police powers are not limited to a public emergency. California’s Supreme Court upheld school immunization requirements in spite of the constitutional right to education in the 19th century, in Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226 (1890). The brief does not suggest any reason to ignore or overturn that jurisprudence; it simply does not mention or address it.

This puts the appellate court in a position of having an extensive jurisprudence against the claims in the complaint, and no good basis in the complaint or appellate brief for rejecting it. The brief attempts to claim it’s a case of first impression – a new case, without governing jurisprudence because it’s making a new argument about mandates and unavoidably unsafe products – that, as I will discuss, is based on a misunderstanding of product liability law – but the issue is not one of first impression: school immunization mandates were extensively adjudicated. Suggesting new grounds to change existing jurisprudence does not make that jurisprudence vanish and does not make a previously decided issue one of first impression.

The brief also does not cure the two problems with religious exemptions mentioned in the demurrer. It does not make a strong claim that the parents have religious opposition to vaccines. It does not even attempt to show it made the claim in the complaint or the trial record. It simply ignores the issue. Nor does it address the jurisprudence according to which neutral laws do not have to provide a religious exemption. Again, it does not even attempt to address this issue.

It does not answer the criticism of the claim of right to education that was made at the trial level – that preventing outbreaks protects the right to education, and that protecting public health is a compelling public interest. It repeats the same arguments it made that the law violates the right to education, and that it’s more important to educate children than to vaccinate them – but it does not provide an answer to the state’s explanation why that’s not a good argument. It does not point to anything in the complaint that counters that.

And it still does not provide any authority for the claim that vaccination status should be a protected category, or even a good argument for it. Here, too, it does not address the arguments in the demurrer.

Basically, the appellate brief ignores its primary mission: to convince the court of appeal that the demurrer was wrongly sustained by the trial judge. It does not even try to accomplish that key task.

Unavoidably unsafe

The appellate brief’s opening argument is that because all vaccines are legally and factually unavoidably unsafe, the state cannot require vaccines as a precondition to school. This claim is based on a set of misunderstandings of product liability law and relevant jurisprudence, as well as on incorrect factual assertions.

In terms of the law, a major confusion in the complaint is that it claims that unavoidably unsafe products are necessarily defective products – which is completely wrong. This needs some context. In 1964, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (a very influential legal source) reflected new developments in state courts by saying that manufacturers will be strictly liable for defective products. This was adopted by all states, and became the basis for our modern product liability law.

Restatements are structured with a general rule followed by explanatory comments. In this case, the brief is trying to refer to comment K. Comment K created an exception to the usual rule for a special category of products, which it called “unavoidably unsafe” products. The name of this category has unfortunately led lay anti-vaccine activists, and some lawyers with, apparently, little knowledge of the subject matter, to wrongly conclude that these products were defectively less safe than others. In reality,  Comment K explained that “such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directives and warnings, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”

When the appellate brief equates an unavoidably unsafe product, such as a vaccine, with a defective design, the appellate brief is simply wrong. In fact, falling into the category of unavoidably unsafe products would mean that the product is not defective by design (and as a corollary, is not unreasonably dangerous, because its risks are far outweighed by its benefits). Nor is there any other basis to see all vaccines as defective in design.

Generally, the brief also seems to assume that the fact that vaccines have inherent risks makes them defective by design – it spends quite a lot of words on trying to emphasize vaccines risks. But the law does not work that way. If any product with a risk was defective by design, sharp knives,  cars, and life-saving drugs would all automatically be found defective – and they are not: it is not easy to show a design defect in a product. Many products have risks, and that does not make them defective. To be defective, you have to actually show more than a risk. Here, too, the brief shows a lack of understanding of product liability. (Because this post is already long, I am not going into further detail – for a more detailed discussion, see here.)

The appellate brief tries to make a distinction between pharmaceutical drugs which, it says, “come with a possible risk of adverse side-effects while vaccines come with a presumed risk of adverse side-effects.” It’s not clear what, exactly, the brief was trying to say here. Both vaccines and drugs have risks, and either can cause, occasionally, side effects.

If the brief is trying to claim that vaccines cause more side effects than drugs, that is a broad and unjustified generalization: drugs vary, and realistically, most vaccines likely have fewer side effects than many or most drugs. This is even more true for serious harms: serious harms from vaccines are extremely rare . The low rate of compensation in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program – less than one per million – further reinforces what science shows on this: serious harms from vaccines are very rare.

The brief claims that:

With 100% certainty, SB277’s vaccine mandate has already killed California school children.

It provides no actual details of deaths, no specific allegations to support that claim. While at the demurrer stage material facts in the complaint are supposed to be presumed true, there really are not a lot of facts in this sentence. There’s an expression of belief, with no facts or support behind it. There is no evidence, or even claims, of deaths related to SB277 – even anti-vaccine groups have not pointed to one. It’s not clear where this belief comes from.

Finally, the appellate brief misrepresents the Supreme Court decision in Bruesewitz vs. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011), that it draws on. The case did not state that design defects are unavoidable, or suggest all vaccines are defective in design. And it clearly rejected the application of the unavoidably unsafe category to vaccines

California SB277 lawsuit appeal – equal protection

The brief also makes glaring legal errors in its discussion of equal protection.

The brief states that “Plaintiffs identify eight (8) separate and distinct bases of disparate treatment; in all instances, the disparate treatment is based on “medical status,” a suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny.” Most of these categories were not in the initial brief and are new claims.

Since the categories include such things as home v. school based students, or different grades, they are clearly not all based on medical status, however the term is defined. But the problem runs deeper.

Under the Fourteenth amendment, a state may not deny people “equal protection of the laws”. But that does not mean laws cannot treat people differently. All or most laws make distinctions, and for the most part, that’s fine. Laws treat jaywalkers different than non jay walkers, give licenses to people who meet criteria and not others, and regulate homeschoolers differently than students in school.

The appellate brief’s treatment of equal protection ignores two fundamental principles of equal protection analysis. The first is that equal protection means treating those similarly situated alike; it’s fine, and often appropriate, to treat those who are not in similar circumstances differently. The second is that even when there are arguable similarities, not all classifications are held to the same standard.

Most legal distinctions are held to a rational basis standard, under which the state just has to show the distinction is reasonably related to a legitimate interest. The brief tries to argue the state should apply strict scrutiny, a much higher standard applied to cases where a classification is based on a protected category (such as race) – but fails to show one.

Let’s go over the plaintiffs’ claims one by one (I am collapsing the discussion of the two categories of distinctions based on grades into one).

  1. Vaccinated v. Unvaccinated students – as pointed in the decision denying a preliminary injunction in the better-reasoned Whitlow lawsuit, unvaccinated children are not similarly situated in comparison to their protected peers: they are at higher risk of preventable diseases, and when they congregate, they increase the risk of outbreaks. It’s not illegal discrimination to treat different cases differently.
  2. Homeschool v. classroom students – again, these children are not similarly situated. The risk of disease transmission is higher in the close school environment than in casual contacts, and homeschooled children do not pose the same level of risk to others.
  3. Children at checkpoint grades v. children at other grades – again, these children are not similarly situated. The complaint emphasizes that there is a differential treatment here, and suggests there is no basis for that – but the goal of checkpoints was to allow for gradual implementation of the law, to reduce the administrative burden on schools and allow transition to as many families as possible. The distinction is temporary, and rationally based on the legitimate interest in gradual implementation of a new requirement. There’s nothing unusual about allowing for gradual implementation of a new regime. (The Affordable Care Act is a major recent example.) In a few years, all children will have gone through one of the checkpoints.
  4. Children not at a checkpoint whose parents filed an exemption before January 2016 – again, there is a rational basis, when you implement a law gradually, to treat children with exemptions on file differently from those who are not. The difference here is based in action, just as the law treats differently those who file tax returns on time and those who do not.
  5. Medically exempt students v. others – again, these students are not similarly situated. Children with medical reasons not to vaccinate are not like children without such reasons. This is not illegal discrimination, because it’s not treating like cases differently.
  6. Children infected with hepatitis B v. children not vaccinated against it – children with a medical condition, like disabled children, are not similarly situated to children who do not have a medical condition, but whose parents chose not to vaccinate. The parents of children with hepatitis B do not have a choice, nor do the children. The parents of the unvaccinated children are choosing not to protect their children from disease.

The brief suggests – wrongly – that these categories discriminate based on medical status, which it equates to vaccination status. The brief refers to section 51 of the Civil Code, The Unruh Act, as a source for medical status. That section prohibits discrimination based on, among other things, “disability, medical condition, genetic information.”

In contrast, parents choosing not to vaccinate their children is not a disability (though it can lead to one if the child gets a preventable disease), not a medical condition, and not genetic. The brief suggests that “vaccination status” should be a protected category – but does not give a single argument or a single relevant case in support of that suggestion. On p. 36 it refers to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and claims that segregation based on vaccination status is as bad as race based discrimination – but Brown is not a case of point – it does not address vaccination status. The brief does not explain which similarities it sees between race based discrimination and distinction based on vaccination status, and the statement is pretty jarring. There is an obvious difference between an immutable characteristic like race and the choice not to vaccinate a child.

The brief does not make a valid equal protection claim, and suggests misunderstandings.

Even if strict scrutiny was the standard, the brief does not make a good case that it was violated. The brief doesn’t address the state’s compelling interest here – which is protecting all children from disease, as stated in the state’s argument in support of its demurrer. Further, the brief’s  argument against narrowly tailored is mistaken because of a misunderstanding of the reason for SB277, discussed below.

Misunderstanding or misstating scenario and facts

The appellate brief seems to radically misunderstand the context for SB277 and its purpose. It describes the measles outbreak – an outbreak that spread to seventeen states and two countries, and that included over 125 cases –  as “a few dozen tourists reportedly contracted measles in Disneyland in Anaheim. This event lasted just a few weeks and fizzled-out all by itself.” (p. 8) This is a gross mischaracterization of the outbreak, in which most cases were in California residents, and most of the cases were unvaccinated.

More than that, the brief misunderstands the role the measles outbreak played in enacting SB277. It suggests the only reason for the bill is to handle the measles outbreak. That is obviously not the case. By the time the bill was signed into law in summer 2015, the outbreak was long over. The measles outbreak served as a warning call – to warn California residents that non-vaccination has reached a danger point, where herd immunity is at risk.

A study of the outbreak showed it was mostly concentrated in counties with low immunization rates. The legislature reacted to this danger by passing SB277 – with the goal to protect California children from disease not during the outbreak, not just from measles, but more generally. In light of that, the brief’s claim that SB277 should be limited to measles is incorrect. Nor would restricting the measure to Anaheim, as the brief suggests as a less restrictive alternative, solve the problem of low rates in several districts in California. Nor would quarantining children during the outbreak prevent future outbreaks.

The brief also suggests quarantining immune compromised children, which would also not prevent outbreak, and would mean punishing children who do not have a choice in deference to  the voluntary choices of the plaintiffs. The final option – “allowing free-thinking citizens to decide for themselves whether it’s safe to visit Disneyland” – would not even help with the measles outbreak, since visitors could transmit the virus to others not in Disneyland, and would certainly do nothing for future outbreaks, which could occur anywhere in the state.

The brief also claims that “nobody know how vaccines work”, drawing on a quote from Althen v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005). It uses this claim as part of the argument for why vaccines are unsafe. The quote is misused: the case talks about the fact that the standard of causation in NVICP is low to “allow the finding of causation in a field bereft of complete and direct proof of how vaccines affect the human body” – it does not say that we have no understanding of how vaccines work. It points out that we do not have absolute knowledge of that. There is an extensive literature on vaccine safety and effectiveness. Literally tens of thousands of studies. We may not know everything, but we know quite a bit. Dr. Paul Offit from The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, who runs the Vaccine Education Center there, said, in relation to that:

I think it that it is fair to say that the public often doesn’t understand how vaccines work. However, the scientists and researchers who created vaccines do understand how they work.

California SB277 lawsuit appeal – badly written

Although this is not the main issue with the appellate brief, I would add that it is not well written. Among other things, it has a very high degree of repetition. It makes no references to the trial court record, something it is required to do. The references to cases are often taken out of context and used for points that are not the actual points in the case. It also, occasionally, makes extreme and unwarranted statements.  Here is one of many examples. On p. 27, the brief says:

The Slippery Slope: It starts with mandatory vaccination of schoolchildren, then mandatory vaccination for school employees, then mandatory vaccination for government employees, then mandatory vaccination for all adults … and then mandatory blood and organ donations … then mandatory genetic modification purportedly to prevent illness … then mandatory sterilization of the poor and disabled … then mandatory euthanasia for the ill and elderly. It’s a slippery slope; SB277 demonstrates how holocausts get started.

This is problematic on several levels. First, it’s extreme. Describing SB277 as “how holocausts get started” is inappropriate. There is a glaring difference between requiring immunization for school and race or disability-based discrimination, violence or mass-murder. Second, it doesn’t make sense. School immunization requirements aim to make children safe from disease; they do not lead by any logical progression to euthanasia or sterilization.

Slippery slope implies a constant slope on which law moves naturally from a higher to a lower height. That’s not the situation here. Here we have completely separate hills that the plaintiffs suggest the law will jump between as goats would. I do not think any court has ever struck down a law because of a jumping goat concern.

In short, the appellate brief for this California SB277 lawsuit appeal does a pretty bad job at arguing that the plaintiffs have a valid claim under law. There does not seem to be a very good reason for an appellate court to overturn the demurrer based on anything in this brief.



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California SB277 lawsuit update – judge rejected Torrey-Love

California SB277 lawsuit

On August 15, 2017 Judge Charles D. Wachob from the Placer County Superior court granted the state’s demurrer to the California SB277 lawsuit (known as Torrey-Love).  In lay terms, dismissed the suit without leave to amend. Demurrer is generally granted when, assuming all the facts plaintiffs claimed are true, the court sees no legal basis for the suit, in technical terms, no cause of action. Continue reading “California SB277 lawsuit update – judge rejected Torrey-Love”

Vaccine informed consent – mandates and liability

vaccine informed consent

Several people have asked me whether having school mandates is in tension with the idea of vaccine informed consent . The answer is no. While school mandates have some effect on parental autonomy, the doctrine of informed consent should not be conflated with autonomy.

For a somewhat different reason, imposing sanctions on those who do not vaccinate is also not a violation of informed consent. Continue reading “Vaccine informed consent – mandates and liability”

SB277 lawsuit ruling – suit from A Voice for Choice dismissed by court

sb277 lawsuit ruling

To remind readers, in November 2016 a fourth lawsuit attacking California’s SB277, the law that removed the personal belief exemption from school immunization requirements, was filed in a district court in California. On January 13, 2017, after a hearing, the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit was granted. This is another SB277 lawsuit ruling that has supported the state of California.

The decision gave leave to amend, because the standard for doing so is very lax – as the decision explains, “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the district court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” But the court left very little room for a successful amendment. It’s unknown yet whether plaintiffs would appeal.

Basically, the court followed the extensive jurisprudence in United States courts supporting school immunization laws, based on their role in protecting the public health.

This post starts by explaining more in detail the court’s decision. Then it addresses – shortly, because that’s not the focus of the case now –  two issues the court did not address in detail: why the plaintiffs’ argument of unconstitutional conditions is unconvincing and the problems with the plaintiffs’ effort to distinguish previous Supreme Court cases.  Continue reading “SB277 lawsuit ruling – suit from A Voice for Choice dismissed by court”

California SB277 vaccine law preliminary injunction hearing

SB277 vaccine law

Today I attended the hearing for a preliminary injunction in the Whitlow suit, one of the lawsuits against California’s SB277 vaccine law. I arrived early to try and get an impression of the judge, and because I was worried that there would be no room in the court (in the end, everyone who wanted got in). I sat in the court from 11am, and after the courtroom was cleared for lunch break stood in line until it was opened, around 1:15.

Below are my impressions. Since Judge Sabraw ordered that all electronic devices be off during the hearing, and I did not bring a legal pad, I could not take notes, so this is based on my recollections – and I apologize to the lawyers on either side if I misremembered their points. I’ll be happy to be corrected on any details.

In this hearing, the question was whether plaintiffs should get a preliminary injunction, an order putting the SB277 vaccine law on hold until the case is decided.

The standard for a preliminary injunction is a four part standard that looks at:

  1. chances of winning on the merits;
  2. whether there will be irreparable harm to the plaintiffs without the injunction;
  3. how the balance of equities falls – whether the harm to the plaintiffs is larger than the harm to the defendants from granting the injunction;  and
  4. whether an injunction is in the public interest. In the hearing, most of the focus was on the legal merits, though there was some discussion about the potential harm to the plaintiffs.

I admit that my impression was that on almost every issue the state had a better argument, with stronger case law supporting it. However, I am – obviously – a supporter of the SB277 vaccine law, and that may bias my views. It was a long hearing, and I’m no doubt not covering every detail.  Continue reading “California SB277 vaccine law preliminary injunction hearing”

California SB277 lawsuit – updated, but still baseless

California SB277 lawsuit

Note: this article is an update to the baseless California SB277 lawsuit that was written about previously published on 1 May 2016. This article adds substantial new information on some of the activities surrounding the lawsuit. Stay tuned, as this situation is fluid and new information will be posted as it becomes clear. Professor Reiss and I will update as necessary. I will repost the article whenever there’s a significant update to the lawsuit.

A California SB277 lawsuit was filed by Attorney T. Matthew Phillips in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Tamara Buck et al v State of California (pdf), or “Buck.” To remind everyone, SB277 is the California law that removed the personal belief exemption to school immunization requirements.

Although the lawsuit commenced for the plaintiffs is in theory, challenging the new statute, the complaint posted online is poorly drafted. Much of the complaint, especially the first section, does not meet the basic pleading standard in California, which requires “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. “ (CCP § 425.10)

As phrased, the complaint does not make valid legal arguments against the new statute. The complaint demands trial by jury when it is elementary law that the relief requested in the complaint would not entitle the plaintiffs to anything but a trial before a judge. The complaint fails to meet the requirement that the attorney’s signature constitutes a certification that “[t]he claims … are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” (CCP § 128.7(b)(2).)

The complaint also contains gross factual errors, which may violate CCP § 128.7(b)(3), though those errors alone, at this stage in the proceedings, probably would not permanently damn the suit in state law at this initial stage. In assessing initial challenges to a complaint, state courts must assume that the factual claims in the complaint are true (not legal conclusions or polemical oratory), even when they are as far-fetched as the ones in this suit.

If the attorneys for the State of California were to demurrer to this complaint (file a motion requesting the court to dismiss the complaint as lacking sufficient grounds), the plaintiffs would probably be given an opportunity to correct the errors. For that reason, and since this post is already too long, I didn’t provide a detailed critique of the complaint’s shortcomings as a legal document.

Frankly, the people who donated money to this suit deserved better. The opposition to SB 277 consists of a minute fraction of California’s citizens. The opposition is misguided, but most of them are sincere in their beliefs and very, very passionate and dedicated to their cause.  Many of them clearly fear vaccines and the new law. I hope the courts will protect the community and children’s health by upholding SB 277 (and to remind everyone, the vaccine-denied children of SB 277 opponents need SB277 as well – they depend on herd immunity to protect them from their parents’ error). But when opponents put their trust in a lawyer, they deserve to have their interests competently and professionally represented. This complaint does not do that.

Of course, the complainants chose the lawyer, and they may have had input into the content of the complaint. They are responsible for that choice. But it is also the lawyer’s responsibility to advise them against making serious mistakes.

It is hard to see much indication that Mr. Phillips gave his clients such advice (unless, of course, advice was offered and rejected). Frankly, the tone of the complaint and the discussion on the complainants’ Facebook page suggests that the content of the complaint was driven by Mr. Phillips or at least supported by him. Continue reading “California SB277 lawsuit – updated, but still baseless”

SB 277 lawsuit – baseless anti-vaccine complaints

There have been several updates to the lawsuit, and subsequently to this article. This article has been republished with the updates. Comments for this article have been closed, but you can comment at the updated version.

An anti-SB 277 lawsuit, Tamara Buck v State of California (hereinafter known as “Buck”) was filed by Attorney T. Matthew Phillips in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. To remind everyone, SB277 is the California law that removed the personal belief exemption to school immunization requirements.

Although the lawsuit commenced for the plaintiffs is in theory, challenging the new statute, the complaint posted online is poorly drafted. Much of the complaint, especially the first section, does not meet the basic pleading standard in California, which requires “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. “ (CCP § 425.10)

As phrased, the complaint does not make valid legal arguments against the new statute. The complaint demands trial by jury when it is elementary law that the relief requested in the complaint would not entitle the plaintiffs to anything but a trial before a judge. The complaint fails to meet the requirement that the attorney’s signature constitutes a certification that “[t]he claims … are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” (CCP § 128.7(b)(2).)

The complaint also contains gross factual errors, which may violate CCP § 128.7(b)(3), though those errors alone, at this stage in the proceedings, probably would not permanently damn the suit in state law at this initial stage. In assessing initial challenges to a complaint, state courts must assume that the factual claims in the complaint are true (not legal conclusions or polemical oratory), even when they are as far-fetched as the ones in this suit.

If the attorneys for the State of California were to demurrer to this complaint (file a motion requesting the court to dismiss the complaint as lacking sufficient grounds), the plaintiffs would probably be given an opportunity to correct the errors. For that reason, and since this post is already too long, I didn’t provide a detailed critique of the complaint’s shortcomings as a legal document.

Frankly, the people who donated money to this suit deserved better. The opposition to SB 277 consists of a minute fraction of California’s citizens. The opposition is misguided, but most of them are sincere in their beliefs and very, very passionate and dedicated to their cause.  Many of them clearly fear vaccines and the new law. I hope the courts will protect the community and children’s health by upholding SB 277 (and to remind everyone, the vaccine-denied children of SB 277 opponents need SB277 as well – they depend on herd immunity to protect them from their parents’ error). But when opponents put their trust in a lawyer, they deserve to have their interests competently and professionally represented. This complaint does not do that.

Of course, the complainants chose the lawyer, and they may have had input into the content of the complaint. They are responsible for that choice. But it is also the lawyer’s responsibility to advise them against making serious mistakes.

It is hard to see much indication that Mr. Phillips gave his clients such advice (unless, of course, advice was offered and rejected). Frankly, the tone of the complaint and the discussion on the complainants’ Facebook page suggests that the content of the complaint was driven by Mr. Phillips or at least supported by him. Continue reading “SB 277 lawsuit – baseless anti-vaccine complaints”

Freedom to ignore French vaccination program – a court case

french vaccination program

Samia and Marc Larère, parents to a three year old and fifteen months old, have decided not to vaccinate them. A criminal charge was brought against them, by the government of France, for not giving their three year old the required vaccines against diphtheria, tetanus and polio according to the French vaccination program.

They were charged under two legal provisions–a provision in the Code of Public Health (le code de la santé publique, art. L.3116-4) that imposes a find of 3750 euros and up to six months in jail for those who do not receive, or allow those under their guardianship to receive, mandatory vaccinations, including parents (“Le refus de se soumettre ou de soumettre ceux sur lesquels on exerce l’autorité parentale ou dont on assure la tutelle aux obligations de vaccination prévues aux articles L. 3111-2, L. 3111-3 et L. 3112-1 ou la volonté d’en entraver l’exécution sont punis de six mois d’emprisonnement et de 3 750 Euros d’amende”).

And a provision in the criminal code that criminalizes neglect of parental duties “to the point of risking the health… of a minor child”, with a fine of 30,000 euros and up to two years in prisons as penalty (article 227-17: “Le fait, par le père ou la mère, de se soustraire, sans motif légitime, à ses obligations légales au point de compromettre la santé, la sécurité, la moralité ou l’éducation de son enfant mineur est puni de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende”).

The reason the Larères initially gave for declining to vaccinate their child was that they could not give her only the required vaccines–the only available vaccines, they said, had the required vaccines in combination with others, like Hepatitis B and meningococcal, which are not legally required and they were not willing to give the combination vaccine to their child.  Upon further probing, however, the couple admitted they received a vaccine containing only the required vaccines from Sanofi Pasteur, but still refused to vaccinate claiming that the vaccine contained a “toxic product”.

It may have been this vaccine (pdf). It’s unclear which ingredients they were referring to. The product contains a number of ingredients that may be used to raise concern among those unfamiliar with their role in vaccines and the principle that the dose makes the poison. In fact, in the tiny amounts in vaccines (pdf), none of these ingredients is toxic (pdf). Continue reading “Freedom to ignore French vaccination program – a court case”

Vaccines and religious exemptions – recent legal decision

This article is by Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law (San Francisco, CA), is a frequent contributor to this and many other blogs, providing in-depth, and intellectually stimulating, articles about vaccines, medical issues, social policy and the law. 

Professor Reiss writes extensively in law journals about the social and legal policies of vaccination. Additionally, Reiss is also member of the Parent Advisory Board of Voices for Vaccines, a parent-led organization that supports and advocates for on-time vaccination and the reduction of vaccine-preventable disease.

On October 5, 2015 the Supreme Court of the United States denied cert in Phillips v. New York, a group of three cases that considered issues surrounding vaccines and religious exemptions. This post shortly explains the case and what denying cert means (and does not mean).

Continue reading “Vaccines and religious exemptions – recent legal decision”

Court decides parents’ refusing vaccinations – not “free exercise of religion”

The US District Court for the Northern District of Ohio has ruled (pdf)  that a parent’s refusing vaccinations for her children against diseases is not a “free exercise” of religion, and is tantamount to neglect.

In April 2010,  the Tuscarawas County (Ohio) Jobs and Family Services (TCJFS) took custody of the children of Charity and Brock Schenker as a result of a domestic violence matter between the parents. TCJFS determined that the children were “neglected and dependent” and worked out case plans for the parents which included psychiatric evaluations, drug testing and supervised visitation of their children. When TCJFS asked about the children’s immunizations, according to Secular News Daily, “Mrs. Schenker claimed she had religious objections to immunizations. The court informed her that the immunizations would be ordered.”

Continue reading “Court decides parents’ refusing vaccinations – not “free exercise of religion””