This article, about Supreme Court decisions that may impact vaccine policy in the US, was written by Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Professor of Law at the University of California Law San Francisco, who is a frequent contributor to this and many other websites, providing in-depth, and intellectually stimulating, articles about vaccines, medical issues, social policy, and the law.
Professor Reiss writes extensively about the social and legal aspects of vaccination in law journals. Reiss is also a member of the Parent Advisory Board of Voices for Vaccines. This parent-led organization supports and advocates for on-time vaccination and the reduction of vaccine-preventable diseases. She is also a member of the Vaccines Working Group on Ethics and Policy.
On 27 June 2025, the Supreme Court released two decisions that are not directly about vaccines but will affect vaccine policy-making. In both decisions, on the plus side, the Supreme Court preserved legal structures that support vaccines and preventive measures. But on the negative side, in one of these cases, the Supreme Court gave the political appointees more power compared to the experts.

Supreme Court and vaccine policy — Kennedy v Braidwood
The first case is Kennedy v. Braidwood. We have discussed this case before. It started as Kelly v. Becerra, then became Braidwood v. Becerra, and finally, it is now Braidwood v. Kennedy. As I mentioned in my post about the Fifth Circuit opinion, which, not to bury the lede, the Supreme Court overturned, the case was a challenge to the preventive services provision of the Affordable Care Act. As I said in my previous post:
Braidwood v Becerra focuses on the preventive services clause of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The clause requires health insurance companies to provide coverage without cost sharing, so without cost to the patient, for four types of services:
• Recommendations of the United States Preventive Services Task Force(hereinafter “the Task Force”) that have an A or B rating;
• Immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) for the individual in question;
• Preventive services or screenings in guidelines by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for minors (babies to adolescents);
• Preventive services or screenings in guidelines by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for women.
Plaintiffs opposed providing coverage for some such services, including HPV vaccines, and contraceptive.
Plaintiff’s opposition had some religious grounds, but that was not the focus of the case, as it went to the Supreme Court. At issue was whether the appointments of the bodies making the decision were constitutional. I provide a more detailed explanation in my previous post.
But the short version is that plaintiffs argued that because the decision is made by people who were not nominated by the President and confirmed by the plaintiffs, in legal terms, not “principal officers”, it was unconstitutional, since policy decisions in our executive branch need to be made by those who are politically accountable to the President. In a case from 2021, the Supreme Court concluded that an officer is an “inferior officer” – i.e., not a principal officer – only if the officer has a superior who can remove them and review their decision that is a principal officer.
The members of the bodies making the preventive coverage recommendations are appointed by the Secretary of HHS, but not nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. So to be constitutional, they need to be removable at will by the Secretary, which everyone agrees they are – but their decisions also need to be directly reviewable by a principal officer.
The Fifth Circuit (and the district court) concluded that the Task Force members are too independent. When it got to the Supreme Court, it only looked at whether the Task Force was too independent; for the moment, ACIP’s decisions are allowed, since they need to be approved by the CDC director, a principal officer (or, for the moment, since there’s no director, by the Secretary).
The Supreme Court, in a majority decision by Justice Kavanaugh, concluded the task force members were inferior officers, since the Secretary can both remove them at will and review their decisions. While the Court did not address ACIP, ACIP’s decisions are even more clearly okay, since they need the Director’s approval (or the Secretary’s) to become operational. The Court mentioned that in footnote 4:
The body within HHS assigned to recommend immunization coverage requirements under the Affordable Care Act—the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices—already operates under such a regulation. The regulation states that a recommendation of the Committee is not “considered in effect” until “it has been adopted by” the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who answers to the Secretary of HHS. 45 CFR §147.130(a)(1)(ii) (2024).
The wrinkle: this means that any decision maker with real power in the administrative state needs to either be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, or needs to be under the control of someone who is. In other words, the Court reaffirms earlier decisions that administrative decisions need political supervision that eventually trickles to the President. This is good for this case, but it does narrow the ability of Congress to make experts independent and gives more power to the political appointees.
There was a dissent by Thomas with Alito and Gorsuch. They would have concluded that the Task Force’s members are too independent.

Supreme Court and vaccine policy — FCC v Consumer Research
In FCC v. Consumer Research, the question was the funding of universal broadband service through a universal service fund that required contributions from telephone companies. The argument of the plaintiffs, in short, was that this violates non-delegation.
The non-delegation doctrine essentially says that since Congress is directly elected, and since the Constitution gives Congress the power to legislate, there are limits on the ability of Congress to delegate that power to administrative agencies. The test our court adopted for this is the intelligible principle case, as said in the case:
To distinguish between the permissible and the impermissible in this sphere, we have long asked whether Congress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409. Under that test, “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475. The “guidance” needed is greater, we have explained, when an agency action will “affect the entire national economy” than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue (e.g., the definition of “country [grain] elevators”). Ibid. But in examining a statute for the requisite intelligible principle, we have generally assessed whether Congress has made clear both “the general policy” that the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.”
Why is this important to vaccines? Because a broader non-delegation doctrine may mean some of the delegations to expert bodies are unconstitutional, and agencies cannot act, for example, can the FDA regulate products?
But the Court did not broaden the non-delegation doctrine. In a majority opinion written by Justice Kagan, the court found that the delegation here easily meets the intelligible principles test. The Court found:
- That there is no separate standard, as plaintiffs asked, for laws that allow agencies to raise revenues from companies. Plaintiffs thought that if something is a tax, rather than a fee, Congress needs to delegate numerical guidelines. The majority pointed out that that’s unworkable.
- The Court found that the statute easily meets the standard. Congress, the Court found, “imposed ascertainable and meaningful guideposts for the FCC to follow when carrying out its delegated function of collecting and spending contributions from carriers.”
Justice Kavanaugh, in a concurrence, emphasized that the goal is to give the President discretion to execute the law. (Justice Jackson’s concurrence raised an issue important for administrative law, but less relevant to the public health community at this point.)
Justice Gorsuch, in a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, would apply a different and stricter standard when the power is to collect a tax, and thought that funding universal service was a tax.
On the plus side, the Court reaffirmed the intelligible principle standard and did not dramatically change our non-delegation rules. On the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence raises a caution that he may, in the future, more strictly apply the non-delegation doctrine, and not all delegations may be safe.
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